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Abstract 
Proponents of evolutionary debunking arguments aim to show that certain genealogical 
explanations of our moral faculties, if true, undermine our claim to moral knowledge. 
Criticisms of these argumentVJHQHUDOO\WDNHWKHGHEXQNHU·Vgenealogical explanation for 
granted. The task of the anti-debunker is thought to be that of reconciling the (supposed) 
truth of this hypothesis with moral knowledge. In this paper, I shift the critical focus 
instead to the GHEXQNHU·VHPSLULFDOK\SRWKHVLVand argue that the skeptical strength of an 
evolutionary debunking argument is dependent upon the evidence for that hypothesis³
evidence which, upon further inspection, proves far from compelling. Following that, 
however, I suggest that the same considerations which spell trouble for the empirical 
hypotheses of traditional debunking arguments can also be taken to give rise to an 
alternative³and better supported³style of debunking argument. 
1. Introduction 
According to proponents of evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs), explanations as to 
how our moral faculties might possibly have arisen can be recruited as a tool for undermining 
moral knowledge (Ruse & Wilson 1986, Joyce 2006, Street 2006).1 EDAs traditionally rest 
XSRQD¶KRZ-SRVVLEO\·VWRU\WKDWH[SODLQVWKHHPHUJHQFHRIRXUPRUDOIDFXOWLHVE\DSSHDOWR
the fitness benefits that they conferred at some stage in our evolutionary past. Debunkers 
argue that supposing the rough accuracy of this story, it would be a lucky coincidence if the 
moral beliefs shaped by these faculties had stumbled upon the moral truths. Tracking facts 
about reproductive fitness is one thing, tracking moral truth is quite another. Insofar as our 
moral beliefs require luck in order to secure truth, they plausibly fall short of knowledge.  
,W KDV EHFRPH FXVWRPDU\ IRU FULWLFV RI ('$V WR WDNH WKH GHEXQNHU·V JHQHDORJ\ IRU
granted. The anti-GHEXQNHU·VEXUGHQLVXVXDOO\WKRXJKWWREHWKDWRIUHFRQFLOLQJWKHVXSSRVHG
truth of this genealogy with moral knowledge (see Brosnan 2011, Vavova 2014). My strategy 
is different. For the sake of argument, I am willing to grant to debunkers that their 
genealogies do cast the epistemic credentials of our moral beliefs into doubt.   
 
1 $QRWHRQWHUPLQRORJ\,XVH¶PRUDOIDFXOWLHV·WRUHIHUWRWKHSV\FKRORJLFDOPHFKDQLVPVDQGSURFHVVHVWKDW
explain why we make the moral judgments that we do. EDAs are not aimed at moral beliefs directly, but at the 
psychological faculties that shape them; the influence of evolutionary forces upon moral beliefs themselves is usually 
thought to be indirect. (See Joyce 2006, pp.180-181; Street 2006, p.119.) 
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0\RZQVWUDWHJ\DSSOLHVDFULWLFDOH\HWRGHEXQNHUV·HYROXWLRQDU\K\SRWKHVHV7R my mind, 
debunkers have not done enough to motivate the empirical plausibility of these accounts of 
moral evolution. In what follows, I shall argue that this spells trouble for their arguments, 
which are in danger of losing their skeptical teeth if they show, at most, that highly 
questionable scientific hypotheses are inconsistent with moral knowledge. Yet all is not lost 
for evolutionary debunking; for the very same considerations which serve to undermine the 
empirical hypotheses of traditional debunking arguments can also be taken to provide a new 
route to moral skepticism. Ultimately, I will suggest that these considerations give rise to an 
alternative³and better supported³style of debunking argument.  
My first order of business will be to articulate the basic structure of EDAs (Sect. 2). I shall 
then direct my focus to the accounts of moral evolution that debunkers have proposed (Sect. 
6XFKDFFRXQWVGRQRWVXUYLYHFULWLFDOVFUXWLQ\'HEXQNHUV·JHQHDORJLHVDUHYXOQHUDEOHWR
substantial empirical challenges, and these challenges should shake our confidence in them. 
In Sect. 4, I consider a genealogy which lacks those features that debunkers take to 
undermine moral knowledge. I then provide reason to suppose that we currently lack the 
empirical resources needed to adjudicate between debunking and non-debunking accounts 
of moral evolution (Sect. 5). These considerations, I will suggest, give rise to a novel 
epistemic situation. Drawing upon recent work in epistemology, I explain how this situation 
may itself give rise to moral skepticism (Sect. 6). 
2. Evolutionary Debunking Arguments 
7KHGHEXQNHU·VDUJXPHQWUHVWVXSRQWKUHHNH\VWHSVZKLFK,ZLOOKHUHRXWOLQHLQEULHI)LUVW
of all, the debunker adopts a particular metaethical position, generally a variety of moral realism 
according to which moral truths hold independently of moral evaluators. Second, the 
debunker posits some evolutionary how-possibly story, an empirical hypothesis as to how our 
moral beliefs might have come to be as they are through purely naturalistic processes. In 
general, the explanation will advert primarily to natural selection, but I defer discussion of 
WKHILQHUGHWDLOVKHUHWR6HFW:KDW·VFHQWUDOO\LPSRUWDQWLVWKDWWKHHYROXWLRQDU\K\SRWKHVLV
makes (or purports to) appeal only to factors which are logically and causally independent of 
the supposed moral truths. Given the truth of that hypothesis, then, and the presupposition 
of realism, we are led to the third, epistemic stage of the argument; that any moral judgements 
we make are, if true at all, only true through some unlikely and epistemically problematic 
kind of coincidence. The debunker concludes that our moral beliefs (judgements) are either 
IDOVHRUDWEHVWFRLQFLGHQWDOO\WUXHDQGFHUWDLQO\QRWZRUWK\RIEHLQJFDOOHG¶NQRZOHGJH· 
My foremost concern in what follows will be the empirical background to EDAs, but let 
me say a few more words about the metaethical and epistemic steps of the argument just 
sketched. It is common to take debunkers to operate under the assumption of moral realism 
(see for example, Kahane 2011, Brosnan 2011, Clarke-Doane 2012).2 On this view, moral 
 
2 ,VKRXOGQRWHWKDW6WUHHW·VWUXHWDUJHWLVHYDOXDWLYHUHDOLVPVKHH[WHQGVWKHVNHSWLFDOFKDOOenge to all 
evaluative beliefs (when their contents are construed realistically), of which moral beliefs form a proper subset. 
Having noted this, I will, for ease of exposition, mostly formulate EDAs in terms of an epistemic challenge to moral 
EHOLHIV¶(YDOXDWLYH·FDQEHVXEVWLWXWHGIRU¶PRUDO·VRDVWRPDNHWKHIRUPXODWLRQILW6WUHHW·VRZQDUWLFXODWLRQ 
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truths hold independently of our attitudes; what is morally right is right regardless of whether 
we happen to think that it is, or how we happen to feel about it. The extent to which EDAs 
rest upon realist assumptions is admittedly a matter of contention (see Joyce 2016). But 
realists are at least thought to be especially vulnerable to the challenge that debunkers pose. 
Russ Shafer-Landau (a realist himself) RIIHUV DKHOSIXO VXPPDU\RI WKH FRUHFRQFHUQ´,W
would be a miracle were there anything like a close correspondence between the deliverances 
of a faculty shaped by evolutionary pressures, and a set of moral truths whose contents (if 
realists are correct) DUHIL[HGLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIWKHRXWSXWVRIWKLVIDFXOW\µS6LQFH
WKHPRUDOUHDOLVWOLHVVTXDUHO\LQWKHGHEXQNHU·VOLQHRIDWWDFN,ZLOOWDNHKHUWREHWKHSULPDU\
target of these skeptical arguments.  
On the matter of the epistemological step, LW·VIDUIURPVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGKRZZHRXJKWWR
WUDQVODWH WKH GHEXQNHU·V WDON RI D ´FRLQFLGHQFHµ LQWR PRUH IDPLOLDU WHUPLQRORJ\ 6RPH
interpret debunkers as aiming to show that our moral beliefs are insensitive to the moral truths; 
that had the moral truths had been different, our moral beliefs would have been the same 
(Clarke-Doane 2012). Yet others have cautioned against formulating EDAs in these terms 
(Korman 2014), and alternative epistemic principles have been explored (Bogardus 2016).  
It will not be necessary to take a strong stand on this issue for my own purposes. What is 
centrally important is that all EDAs trade upon empirical claims about moral evolution. The 
intended lesson of these evolutionary hypotheses may be that our moral faculties are 
insensitive to the moral truths. Or, it may be that these faculties are unreliable, or that they 
are unsafe. But no such lessons can reasonably be drawn if the evolutionary hypotheses 
WKHPVHOYHVGRQ·WSDVVPXVWHU,QVRIDUDVWKHVHHPSLULFDOFODLPVDUHQRWSODXsible, they are 
not plausibly cause for epistemological alarm.  
Though taking a strong stand will not be necessary, it will still be useful to have a 
reasonable reconstruction of the epistemological step to work with for the purposes of the 
ensuing discussion. To this end, I propose that we take EDAs to operate upon the following 
two assumptions:3 
Epistemic Assumption #1  
,Q OLJKW RI WKH GHEXQNHU·V HYROXWLRQDU\ K\SRWKHVLV ZH ZRXOG UHTXLUH DQ
epistemically problematic sort of luck in order for our moral beliefs to be true.  
Epistemic Assumption #2  
Knowledge requires the absence of such luck. 
7KHILUVWDVVXPSWLRQLVVXJJHVWHGE\WKHGHEXQNHU·VFODLPWKDWQDWXUDOVHOHFWLRQVWHHUHGRXU
moral faculties in directions having nothing at all to do with the moral truths (Joyce 2006, 
p.222; Street 2006, p.122).4 The accompanying concern is that there is no appropriate 
explanatory connection between our evolved moral faculties and the moral truths if the 
debunking genealogy is correct.5 Even if our moral beliefs had come to line up in the right 
ZD\ZLWKWKHPRUDOWUXWKVWKLVZRXOGJLYHQWKHLUHYROXWLRQDU\RULJLQVEH´«DPDWWHURI
 
3 For similar diagnoses, see Shafer-Landau (2012) and Dunaway (2017). 
4 All unattributed citations to Joyce and Street henceforth will be to their respective 2006 publications. 
5 I borrow this way of framing things from Korman (2014). 
J. Isserow| 4 of 21 
 
VKHHUOXFNµ6WUHHWS7KHVHFRQGDVVXPSWLRQLVVRPHWKLQJWKDW,GRQ·WWDNHWR
require much in the way of elaboration; it is widely (even if not unanimously) accepted that 
epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge. 
7KLVDGPLWWHGO\EURDGFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRIWKHGHEXQNHU·VHSLVWHPRORJLFDOVWHSZLOOVXIILFH
for my purposes. My foremost concern is to put pressure on the empirical merits of the 
GHEXQNHU·VJHQHDORJ\³not to explore the finer contours of her epistemic reasoning. In what 
follows, then, I shall be granting to the debunker arguendo that particular genealogies which 
strongly suggest an absence of an appropriate explanatory connection between our moral 
faculties and the moral truths undermine moral knowledge. 
3. Debunking Genealogies 
7KHGHEXQNHU·VHPSLULFDOK\SRWKHVLVSOD\VDQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQKHUGHEXQNLQJDUJXPHQW,I
that hypothesis is close to correct, then moral skepticism looms (given the assumption of 
realism). If, on the other hand, that hypothesis is lacking in empirical plausibility, then at best 
she will have shown us that a questionable genealogy is inconsistent with moral knowledge. 
$QGWKDW·VKDUGO\OLNHOy to leave the realist quivering in her boots.  
Though Richard Joyce and Sharon Street are not the only philosophers to have recruited 
an evolutionary hypothesis in service of moral skepticism, their genealogies will form our 
focus in the ensuing discussion. Though my aim will be to put pressure upon the empirical 
plausibility of these how-possibly stories, it should be noted from the outset that my 
intention is not to show them to be false. The primary purpose of gesturing towards these 
issues is to arouse a sense of epistemic unease.   
It should also be noted that Joyce and Street are not being singled out for target practice. 
Ultimately, I will argue that other accounts of moral evolution likewise encounter significant 
problems, and will suggest that these problems may very well be a symptom of a deeper 
issue³it may be that ZHVLPSO\DUHQ·WLQDSRVLWLRQWRSODFHDJUHDWGHDORIRXUFRQILGHQFH
in any account of our moral past.  The ultimate aim of Sections 3-5 then, will be to show that 
there is good reason to regard our position with respect to our moral history as one fraught 
with epistemic limitations (the implications of which will then be discussed in Sect. 6). 
-R\FH·VJHQHDORJ\ 
Joyce begins his how-possibly story by noting that evolution furnished us with various kinds 
of prosocial propensities that inclined us to cooperate with one another (pp.47-51). Though 
helpful, these inclinations were unreliable; our desires to cooperate can and often do falter. 
Given that the cooperative sphere is of far too great evolutionary significance to be at the 
mercy of such fickle inclinations, more effective motivational mechanisms were required. 
Joyce hypothesizes that these mechanisms were our moral faculties (pp.111-3).  
It is important to note from the outset that Joyce understands this capacity for moralized 
WKRXJKWLQDFRJQLWLYHO\ULFKZD\0RUDOIDFXOWLHVGRQ·WFRPHFKHDSWKH\UHTXLUH´FRJQLWLYH
DQGFRQFHSWXDOVRSKLVWLFDWLRQµS7KHPHUHFDSDFLW\WRFODVVLI\DFWLRQVDVULJKWRUZURQJ
for instance, does not suffice. One must also be able to grasp certain formal properties of 
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and relations between moral concepts (pp.67-9). Moral faculties require something above 
and beyond a suite of emotions, or emotional dispositions. 
2Q -R\FH·V K\SRWKHVLV WKHQ RXU PRUDO IDFXOWLHV ZHUH VHOHFWHG IRU WR ERRVW RXU
cooperative dispositions. Cooperation is more likely to transpire when one believes it to be 
a moral requirement. When early humans developed these moral faculties, they came to 
conceive of helping behavior as an inescapable obligation, the force of which could not be 
overridden by competing interests which favored non-compliance (pp.60-3).  Moral faculties 
therefore earned their evolutionary keep by enabling individuals to block competing interests 
that would interfere with prosocial motivation from the deliberative sphere³they 
IXQFWLRQHG DV GHYLFHV RI ´SHUVRQDO FRPPLWPHQWµ SS-122). Given that prosocial 
behavior is often costly, moral faculties also came to serve as signs of interpersonal 
commitment; they offered early humans a means by which to convincingly signal their 
prosocial dispositions to others.   
Though it is admittedly difficult to do complete justice to the impressively detailed 
hypothesis that Joyce develops, the above seems to me to be a faithful summary of its key 
claims. However, it strikes me that this hypothesis is vulnerable to a number of substantial 
FKDOOHQJHV0\ILUVWFRQFHUQSHUWDLQVWR-R\FH·VFODLPWKDWRXUPRUDOIDFXOWLHVZHUHVHOHFWHG
for because they furnished early humans with a capacity to commit themselves to prosocial 
behavior. There are alternative explanations for our capacity to commit to prosocial 
behavior³explanations which strongly suggest that there is no need to posit any moral 
faculties to do the work. 
5REHUW)UDQN·VUHVHDUFKRQWKHPRUDOSDVVLRQVVXJJHVWVWKat a capacity to commit 
to prosocial action merely requires a disposition to experience particular, motivationally 
SRZHUIXOHPRWLRQV)UDQNSURSRVHVWKDW´ PRUDOSDVVLRQVµHYROYHGWRFRQWURORXUWHPSWDWLRQ
to favor immediate over long-term rewards (1988, p.82). An agent who is inclined to 
experience the aversive emotion of guilt, for instance, is better equipped with the 
psychological resources to resist the temptation to betray a hunting partner. This, in turn, 
earns her a reputation as a trustworthy individual, and thereby makes her more likely to be 
chosen as a partner in beneficial, cooperative ventures in the future (1988, p.17). According 
to Frank, these emotions, when activated, are accompanied by involuntary and observable 
symptoms³perspiration and blushing, for example. Over time, these symptoms came to be 
associated with the presence of the emotions with which they were reliably correlated. This 
enabled the moral emotions to function as hard-to-fake, honest signals of commitment and 
trustworthiness.6 
,QIDLUQHVVWR-R\FHKHWDNHVKLPVHOIWREHVXSSOHPHQWLQJ)UDQN·VDFFRXQWUDWKHUWKDQ
REMHFWLQJWRLWS%XWWKHLUDFFRXQWVGLYHUJHLQDFUXFLDOUHVSHFW)UDQN·VPRUDOSDVVLRQV
are not moral faculties. For Joyce, moral faculties are underwritten not only by emotions, but 
also by much more phylogenetically recent cognitive machinery³rich conceptual capacities 
SDQGODQJXDJHSDPRQJWKHP)UDQN·VDFFRXQWWKHUHIRUHFRQVWLWXWHVDJHQXLQH
 
6 Detailing the finer contours of hard to fake, honest signals is well beyond the scope of this paper. See Frank 
(1988) for an informative discussion. 
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DOWHUQDWLYHWR-R\FH·VK\SRWKHVLVLWGRHVQRWSRVLWPoral faculties to explain our capacity to 
FRPPLW WRSURVRFLDOEHKDYLRU ,QGHHG)UDQN·V DFFRXQW VXJJHVWV WKDW WKHUH LVQRQHHG WR
invoke moral faculties to do the explanatory work. Pace Joyce, we can explain our capacity 
for prosocial commitment by appealing to phylogenetically ancient emotional machinery³
most centrally, a capacity to experience emotions such as aggression and guilt. 
2IFRXUVH-R\FHGRHVQ·WFODLPWKDWPDNLQJPRUDOMXGJPHQWVLVWKHRQO\RUHYHQWKHEHVW
way to motivate prosocial behavior. He only claims that it helps enough to be selectively 
advantageous. But evolution is a satisficer³not a maximizer. Wholly new motivational 
mechanisms are unlikely to be selected for when existing structures (in this case, our 
emotional centres) can be manipulated to fulfil the same evolutionary end. Given that 
PRWLYDWLRQDO PHFKDQLVPV UHVHPEOLQJ )UDQN·V PRUDO SDVVLRQV ZHUH DOUHDG\ DYDLODEOH WR
enhance our cooperative dispositions, it becomes much less plausible that there were strong 
selective pressures favoring the evolution of moral faculties of the kind that Joyce envisages. 
This is not to say that wholly new or specialized motivational machinery is never selected 
for. (Joyce (pp.114-5) cites the example of the orgasm.) It is only to suggest that a hypothesis 
which takes such mechanisms to have been selected for is at a theoretical disadvantage 
compared to one which does the same explanatory work without them. 
7KHUHDUHLQWHUQDOWHQVLRQVZLWKLQ-R\FH·VK\SRWKHVLVDVZHOO-R\FHFODLPVERWKWKDWLWKH
need for cooperative motivation explains the emergence of our moral faculties, and that (ii) 
language is a precondition for morality (pp.84-5). This package of claims becomes 
problematic once we reflect upon the relationship between language and cooperation.7 
Language is itself an expression of cooperation; it a subtle form of informational 
cooperation, and one that arguably requires a rich level of cooperation as a precondition for 
its emergence (Sterelny 2012b, p.105; see also Tomasello 2008; Hurford 2007). Moreover, 
alongside the evolution of language, we could expect other forms of cooperation to have 
developed; for through enriching communication, language also enhances cooperation, paving 
the way for reputation effects and the resolution of coordination issues (see Smith 2010). 
-R\FH·VK\SRWKHVLVWKDWRXUPRUDOIDFXOWLHVZHUHDQDGDSWDWLRQWKDWHQKDQFHGFRRSHUDWLYH
motivation is therefore even more dubious once we factor in his claim that language is a 
necessary precondition for morality. A social world in which language is present is a social 
ZRUOG ´WKDW KDV ORQJ-EHHQ FRRSHUDWLYHµ 6WHUHOQ\ E S 3ODXVLEO\ D VXEVWDQWLDO
motivation to cooperate was already present prior to the arrival of our moral faculties. This 
puts quite a bit of pressure on the hypothesis that those faculties were selected for to provide 
a much-needed boost to our cooperative dispositions.8 
 
7 My criticism here is structurally identical to one that Kim Sterelny (2012b) has raised against Philip Kitcher 
ZKRVHJHQHDORJ\VKDUHVVLPLODUDVVXPSWLRQVWR-R\FH·V 
8 A possible recourse for Joyce would be to argue that certain forms of cooperation are a prerequisite to language 
use, whereas other (more sophisticated) forms of cooperation require language³though this would require spelling 
out both why (i) more sophisticated forms of co-operation were plausibly needed, and (ii) the degree to which moral 
faculties can plausibly be taken to have been important for their emergence and persistence. 
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6WUHHW·VJHQHDORJ\ 
6WUHHW·VJHQHDORJ\WDNHVRIIIURPWKH LQWXLWLYH LGHDWKDWWKHNLQGVRIHYDOXDWLYH MXGJPHQWV
that an organism is disposed to make have important consequences for its reproductive 
success (pp.114-,WLVVKHVXJJHVWV´RQO\UHDVRQDEOHWRH[SHFWWKHUHWRKDYHEHHQRYHU
the course of our evolutionary history, relentless selective pressure on the content of our 
evaluDWLYH MXGJHPHQWV RU« ´SURWRµ YHUVLRQV WKHUHRIµ S 6WUHHW OLNHQV WKHVH EDVLF
proto-evaluative responses to the hard-wired response of a Venus fly-trap when it detects 
SUH\´HDFKPD\EHVHHQDVKDYLQJWKHVDPHSUDFWLFDOSRLQWWRJHWWKHRUJDQLVPWR respond 
WRLWVFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQDZD\WKDWLVDGDSWLYHµS 
6WUHHW·VVWRU\SRVLWVFRQWLQXLW\EHWZHHQWKHEDVLFHYDOXDWLYHWHQGHQFLHVRIRXUFORVHDSH
relatives and our own. She understands chimpanzees, for instance, to be capable of some 
form of proto-evaluation, whereby they experience certain things in their world as counting 
in favor of certain responses on their behalf (pp.117-9).  The uniquely human capacity for 
UHIOHFWLYHDQGOLQJXLVWLFHYDOXDWLYHMXGJPHQWVLVXQGHUVWRRGDV´DUHODWLYHO\ODWHHvolutionary 
add-RQVXSHULPSRVHGRQWRSRIPXFKPRUHEDVLFEHKDYLRUDODQGPRWLYDWLRQDOWHQGHQFLHVµ
Thus, evolution is understood to have influenced the content of human evaluative judgments 
indirectly, by having first directly influenced the more basic evaluative tendencies upon 
which they were constructed. 
This story is implausible in certain respects. Street claims that basic evaluative judgments 
DUH´DQDORJRXVWRµFHUWDLQNLQGVRIKDUGZLUHGPHFKDQLVPVWKDWZHVHHLQRWKHURUJDQLVPV
In each case, a particular adaptive response comes to be paired with particular cues in the 
HQYLURQPHQW:KHUHDVD´«UHIOH[PHFKDQLVPGRHVWKLVWKURXJKDSDUWLFXODUKDUG-wiring of 
WKHQHUYRXVV\VWHPµDQHYDOXDWLYHMXGJPHQW´GRHVWKLVE\KDYLQJWKHRUJDQLVPH[SHULHQFH
a partLFXODUUHVSRQVHDVFDOOHGIRURUDVGHPDQGHGE\WKHFLUFXPVWDQFHLQTXHVWLRQµSS-
7KHDQDORJ\VXJJHVWV WKDW WKHFRQWHQWRIHYDOXDWLYH MXGJPHQWV LV IDLUO\ LQÁH[LEOHDQG
cue-bound. Yet this is questionable on empirical grounds. Moral judgments in particular 
exhibit remarkable phenotypic plasticity; their contents vary with different cultural contexts 
(along with other environmental factors). Individual rights are a primary source of moral 
concern in some cultures. In others, communal duties are emphasized (Vauclair & Fisher 
2011). Cultures also differ in the extent to which they endorse moral values pertaining to 
harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity (Graham et. al 2011). Of course, basic evaluative 
tendencies may plausibly play a role in shaping the content of these moral judgments. But 
their role is not nearly as central as Street supposes. The impact of ontogenetic factors 
strongly suggests that the content of evaluative judgments is deeply sensitive to other 
influences.9 
Another issue wiWK 6WUHHW·V DFFRXQW LV WKH RPLVVLRQ RI HPSLULFDO GHWDLO +RZ-possibly 
stories typically constitute cumulative narratives; they specify the succession of 
environmental pressures and steps in the evolutionary trajectory that may have led to the 
 
9 See Deem (2016), who DOVR WDNHV LVVXHZLWKWKLVIHDWXUHRI6WUHHW·VDFFRXQWDQGFRQVLGHUVDKRVWRIRWKHU
important ontogenetic factors. See also Prinz (2009), who doubts that there is even canalization for very basic and 
general moral values. 
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development of a known phenomenon.10 Presumably, this applies to our evaluative 
capacities³no one thinks that we suddenly woke up one day making full-blown moral 
MXGJPHQWV$OWKRXJK,GRQ·WPHDQWRVXJJHVWWKDW6WUHHWLVFRPPLWWHGWRVXFKDFODLPWKHUH
are nonetheless important gaps in her genealogy and among the most important of these are 
the steps that led from proto-evaluative tendencies to full-blown evaluative capacities.  
6WUHHW·VHYROXWLRQDU\VWRU\PRYHVTXLFNO\IURPEDVLFHYDOXDWLYHWHQGHQFLHVWRWKHFDSDFLW\
for reflective evaluative judgment. Yet there are surely other psychological precursors to our 
capacity for reflective evaluative judgment that our proto-evaluative predecessors are unlikely 
to have had³a shared, verbal language (Joyce 2006), and improved impulse control (Sterelny 
E DPRQJ WKHP:LWKRXW WKHVHGHWDLOV ILOOHG LQ DFHQWUDOFODLPRI6WUHHW·VJHQHDORJ\
becomes less plausible; it remains an open possibility that our reflective evaluative capacities 
are not a mere extension of more basic evaluative tendencies. Other psychological faculties 
may very well have constituted an important part of the foundation upon which our capacity 
for reasoned, evaluative judgment was constructed.  
This is at once an empirical and a philosophical problem. Leaving these details unspecified 
LPSDFWVXSRQWKHDFFRXQW·VHPSLULFDOSODXVLELOLW\%XWWKHRPLVVLRQRIGHWDLODOVRVXJJHVWV
that the genealogy cannot so easily be recruLWHGIRUVNHSWLFDOSXUSRVHV*LYHQWKDW6WUHHW·V
how-possibly story is considerably minimal in its exposition of the how, it underdetermines 
the evolution of our evaluative capacities. And this, in turn, threatens its skeptical potential; 
for the realist may very well fill in these gaps in a manner that is hostile to the debunking 
project. (I will explore one promising way in which she might go about doing so in Sect. 4.2.) 
3.3 Take away 
,KDYHDUJXHGWKDWGHEXQNHUV·JHQHDORJLHVDUHYXOQHUDEOHWRVXEVWDQWLDl empirical challenges. 
While such challenges are by no means decisive against their hypotheses, they should shake 
our confidence in them. However, one might worry that all of this is of cold comfort to the 
moral realist. It may very well be true that debunkers construct their skeptical arguments 
upon dubious empirical foundations. But perhaps no empirical hypothesis is friendly to the 
claim that we have moral knowledge. I will now suggest that this is not the case. 
4. A non-debunking genealogy 
Neither Joyce nor Street thinks that just any account of moral evolution is capable of 
undermining moral knowledge; they do not rest their skeptical hopes upon the claim that 
our moral faculties can be afforded some evolutionary explanation or other. Their arguments 
depend quite heavily upon the assumption that a particular kind of genealogy explains why we 
have the moral faculties that we have³one that has certain features which suggest a lack of 
an appropriate connection between our moral faculties and the moral truths.  
 
10 Or at least, plausible how-possibly stories arguably do so. See Sterelny (2012a) for a compelling criticism of 
´NH\-LQQRYDWLRQµmodels of human evolution. 
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On the most common sort of debunking hypothesis, the feature in question is the 
doxastically troubling influence of natural selection.11 Since these selective forces seem to be 
a skepticism-producing feature par excellence for debunkers, a natural move is to explore 
the promise of a by-product account of moral evolution, according to which our moral 
faculties were a side-effect of other capacities that may or may not themselves have been 
selected for. It is to such an account that I now turn.12 
$\DOD·Vgenealogy 
Francisco Ayala (1987, pp.327-9) proposes that our moral faculties were a by-product of the 
following intellectual capacities:   
$7KHFDSDFLW\WRDQWLFLSDWHWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIRQH·VDFWLRQV 
(A2) The capacity to judge certain things as more desirable than others.  
(A3) The capacity to choose between alternative courses of actions.   
Although Ayala believes that these capacities were likely the result of selection, he denies 
that moral faculties themselves were adaptive (1987, pp.236-9). Our moral faculties were 
simply a by-product of such capacities; they came along for the ride with our sophisticated 
intellectual repertoire. Ayala takes these intellectual capacities to be unique in their most 
developed form to human beings. Indeed, he denies any meaningful relation between our 
moral faculties and the capacities that underwrite the social behavior of other animals.  
Insofar as moral norms are concerned, Ayala concedes that our moral codes often appear 
to be consistent with the biological dispositions of our own and other species (1987, pp.237-
242). He emphasizes, however, that this congruency is neither necessary nor universal. 
Although moral codes cannot deviate too far from our reproductive interests (lest they 
promote their own demise), they are not influenced by our biological nature to any significant 
degree.  
/LNHGHEXQNHU·VDFFRXQWV$\DOD·VJHQHDORJ\LVQRWZLWKRXWLWVSUREOHPV2QHLVVXHLVKLV
denying any meaningful relation between the capacities that underwrite social behavior in 
other animals and our moral competence. Even if the three intellectual capacities that Ayala 
lists are jointly necessary for moral agency, it seems exceedingly unlikely that they are 
sufficient. Other cognitive capacities and emotional dispositions are needed to underwrite 
moral competence. Importantly, a number of these are found in other apes, including a 
capacity for empathy (Bekoff & Pierce 2009, Flack & de Waal 2000); and other emotions 
 
11 I do not mean to suggest that any adaptive explanation of a cognitive faculty precludes us from forging an 
appropriate explanatory connection between that faculty and a particular domain of truths. Plausibly, natural 
selection has not been a distorting influence upon various commonsense beliefs that we hold (e.g., beliefs in the 
existence of ourselves and other bodies). As Wilkins and Griffiths (2013) point out, fitness-tracking and truth-
WUDFNLQJGRQ·WVHHPWRFRPHDSDUWKHUHWUXHFRPPRQVHQVHEHliefs are plausibly linked to evolutionary success.   
12 I am here granting the assumption that human morality is a unified phenomenon that may properly be 
described as an adaptation, or a by-product. Sterelny and Fraser voice an appropriate suspicion of this assumption, 
QRWLQJ WKDWKXPDQPRUDOLW\ LV VRPHWKLQJRI D´FRPSOH[PRVDLFµ WKHPDQ\HOHPHQWVRI ZKLFKSODXVLEO\´KDYH
GLIIHUHQWRULJLQVUHVSRQGWRGLIIHUHQWVHOHFWLYHIRUFHV>DQG@GHSHQGRQGLIIHUHQWFRJQLWLYHFDSDFLWLHVµS
Though this does suggest that debunking genealogies tend to oversimplify things, it does not undercut the basic 
argument to be developed in what follows. If anything, it supports my contention that extant accounts of moral 
evolution are empirically questionable. 
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(Fessler & Gervais 2010); along with³arguably but by no means uncontroversially³a sense 
of fairness (Brosnan & de Waal 2003); and some capacity for social learning (Tennie et. al 
2009). Considerations of evolutionary parsimony suggest that we should take many of these 
psychological capacities of our close ape relatives to be homologous to those which explain 
our moral competence. (See de Waal 2006; Boehm 2012.)  
A further issue is that our biological nature shapes the norms that we endorse to a greater 
degree than Ayala supposes. Norms that arouse our emotional centres often have more 
cultural fitness (Nichols 2004). Learning biases can likewise have important effects upon 
norm transmission (Richerson & Boyd 2005). 
$\DOD·VDFFRXQWDQRQ-debunking genealogy 
Debunkers would be hard-SUHVVHGWRXVH$\DOD·VK\SRWKHVLVLQVHUYLFHRIWKHLUVNHSWLFDOHQGV
7KHWUDGLWLRQDOPHWKRGRIGHEXQNLQJZRQ·WZRUNKHUHWKHFODLPWKDWWKHUHLVQRDSSURSULDWH
explanatory connection between our moral faculties qua products of natural selection and 
the moral truths no longer has any bite if our moral faculties were not the products of 
VHOHFWLYH IRUFHV $\DOD·V DFFRXQW VHHPV WR VKHOWHU RXU PRUDO EHOLHIV IURP WKHVH VRUWV RI
distorting influences. 
There is another, more LPSRUWDQWUHVSHFWLQZKLFK$\DOD·VPRUDOJHQHDORJ\LVXQIULHQGO\
to the debunking project: it is considerably friendly to the realist. Many realists believe that the 
FRJQLWLYH VNLOOV WKDW HQDEOH XV WR GLVFRYHU PRUDO WUXWKV DUH ´PRUH JHQHUDO SRZHUV RI
reasRQLQJµ&XQHR	6KDIHU-Landau 2014, p.427), or abilities to subject ourselves to certain 
´QRUPVRIWKRXJKWµ1DJHOS$\DODK\SRWKHVL]HVWKDWRXUFDSDFLW\WRPDNHPRUDO
judgments is a by-product of intellectual capacities such as these. This, in turn, lays a suitable 
foundation upon which to construct an appropriate explanatory connection between our 
moral faculties and the moral truths. The realist can argue that we have the ability to track 
moral truths because the capacities necessary to do so³general powers of reasoning and the 
like³were adaptive.   
+RZHYHUZHVKRXOGQ·WGHFODUHYLFWRU\RQEHKDOIRIWKHUHDOLVWMXVW\HW:HPXVWFRQVLGHU
a pre-emptive criticism from Street, who is suspicious that by-product accounts evade her 
skeptical challenge (pp.142-44). Whatever capacity C the realist thinks our moral faculties are 
a by-product of, Street claims that she must either affirm or deny a relation between that 
capacity and the moral truths. Suppose that the realist chooses the former. The challenge 
now is to explain what this relation is. And at this stage, Street doubts that the realist can say 
anything other than this: C involves a basic ability to grasp moral truths, of which our current 
ability to grasp moral truths is a sophisticated extension. Yet this leaves her vulnerable to a 
dilemma. Either (1) the more basic capacity C arose by fluke (a remarkable coincidence), or 
(2) it was selected for in order to track moral truths (a scientifically implausible claim).  
On closer inspection, however, 6WUHHW·VGLOHPPDWXUQVRXWWREHDIDOVHGLOHPPD/HW·V
WDNHWKHVHFRQGKRUQILUVW1RQHRIWKHDELOLWLHVZKLFKFRQVWLWXWH$\DOD·VFDSDFLW\&VHHP
to have been selected for to track moral truths. Indeed, Ayala explains the selection for an 
ability to aQWLFLSDWHWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIRQH·VDFWLRQV$E\DSSHDOWRWKHFRJQLWLYHDELOLWLHV
needed for tool construction. The construction of tools requires anticipating the uses to 
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ZKLFKWKH\ZLOOEHSXWFRQFHLYLQJRIWKHP´ «DVPHDQVWKDWVHUYHFHUWDLQHQGVRUSXUSRVHVµ
(1987, p.238). 
,W·VDOVRZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWWKHUHDUHDQXPEHURIFDQGLGDWHVIRUFDSDFLW\&DVLGHIURP
those Ayala considers. On a recent by-product account developed by Michael J. Deem, for 
H[DPSOH FDSDFLW\& LV WKRXJKW WR LQYROYH´WKH DELOLW\ to discriminate, abstract from, and 
classify persons, events, and actions, the ability to anticipate and predict consequences of 
RQH·VRZQEHKDYLRUDQGWKDWRIRQH·VFRQVSHFLÀFVDQGWKHFDSDFLW\IRUEHOLHIIRUPDWLRQµ
(2016, p.738). Once again, there seems to be no good grounds for supposing that these 
abilities were selected for to track moral truths. As Deem notes, these features of our 
cognitive architecture were arguably important for enabling early humans to navigate their 
way around ecologically varied or informationally opaque environments (see Godfrey-Smith 
1996, Sterelny 2003).  
,W·VWUXHWKDWLIWKHUHDOLVWZHUHWRDIILUPDUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ&DQGWKHPRUDOWUXWKVWKHQ
there would need to be an appropriate explanatory connection between the cognitive abilities 
to which C refers and a capacity for moral truth-WUDFNLQJ%XWLW·VXQFOHDUZK\6WUHHWWKLQNV
that this connection could only be explained by saying that C itself involves a basic ability to 
grasp moral truths. C can instead be regarded as a foundation upon which the skills that are 
relevant to moral competence are able to develop³skills such as abilities to form beliefs, 
UHDVRQDEVWUDFWO\DQGDQWLFLSDWHWKHOLNHO\FRQVHTXHQFHVRIRQH·VDFWLRQV 
As far as I can tell, none of the above seems tRLPSDOHWKHUHDOLVWXSRQ6WUHHW·VILUVWKRUQ
nothing commits her to the claim that capacity C arose by fluke. Consider the suggestion that 
C might involve discriminatory abilities, together with a capacity for belief-formation. As I 
have noted, it would be implausible to suggest that these capacities arose by fluke; it is 
reasonable to suppose that there was a need for more sophisticated cognitive abilities in 
informationally opaque environments.  
The by-product views canvassed above would therefore seem to escape the dilemma 
unscathed. In what follows, then, I will assume that such accounts constitute non-debunking 
genealogies; they allow us to forge an appropriate explanatory connection between our moral 
faculties and the moral truths. 
5. Our epistemic situation 
So far, my arguments seem to work to the advantage of the moral realist; she can opt for a 
non-debunking genealogy, and in doing so, avoid the skeptical consequences of a debunking 
one. Yet one might think that such arguments are at least somewhat to the advantage of the 
debunker as well. After all, it is still open to her to embrace a debunking genealogy.   
It would be a happy result if we could simply we let a thousand flowers bloom. But of 
course, we cannot simply permit the realist or the debunker to affirm whichever genealogy 
is to their philosophical tastes. In what follows, I shall argue that insofar as the mystery of 
our moral past remains a mystery, the most reasonable course of epistemic action may very 
well be for each party to suspend judgment upon which genealogy is correct. 
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5.1 The mystery of the moral past 
Debunking and non-debunking genealogies alike are vulnerable to substantial empirical 
challenges. The proposal that I now want to explore is that these challenges may actually be 
a symptom of a deeper issue: that all of the evidence is not in (and perhaps is not likely ever 
to be in) when it comes to our moral past.  
This proposal has been developed in detail by the evolutionary biologist Richard 
Lewontin (1998), who has long argued that we are drastically lacking in the sort of data that 
would be needed to understand the evolution of human cognition more generally. But the 
skeptical sentiment is by no means unique to him. (Richardson (1996) pushes a similar line.) 
Even those in the business of reconstructing the trajectory that our moral evolution might 
have taken are careful to acknowledge the epistemic limitations that we face. Joyce observes 
WKDWDUJXPHQWVIRUDQGDJDLQVWKXPDQSV\FKRORJLFDOQDWLYLVP´VHHPWRJHQHUDWHDSHFXOLDU
amounW RI HQWUHQFKHG LQWHOOHFWXDO DFHUELW\«LW LV D XVHIXO SDOOLDWLYH WR IUHTXHQWO\ UHPLQG
RXUVHOYHVRIWKHFRPPRQJURXQGVKDUHGE\DOOUHDVRQDEOHDGYRFDWHV WKDWZHUHDOO\GRQ·W
NQRZ\HWµ S3KLOOLS.LWFKHUVLPLODUO\FRQFHGHV WKDW UHFRQVWUXFWLQJRXU actual 
PRUDOSDVW´«LVSODLQO\EH\RQGWKHHYLGHQFHDYDLODEOHµQRWLQJWKDWWKH´GDWDDUHWRRVSDUVH
WRVFUHHQRXWULYDOK\SRWKHVHVDERXWWKHVHTXHQFHRIHYHQWVµS 
These remarks suggest a worrying under-determination of theory by available evidence. 
Insofar as we cannot gain empirical traction on a range of relevant issues (e.g., facts about 
genetic differences and ancestral environments), we cannot be sufficiently confident that 
certain features of human cognition (e.g., moral cognition) evolved one way rather than 
another (Lewontin 1998). The available evidence does not allow us to reliably adjudicate the 
competing hypotheses we have so far developed. 
Indeed, we arguably do not even have access to the full space of reasonable empirical 
hypotheses about the evolution of moral cognition. Certainly, the possibilities have not yet 
been mapped out by anyone, even from a very coarse-grained point of view. What we have 
now is likely to be but a small scattering of possible hypotheses that, for all we know, may 
not be representative of the wider range of possibilities. One can certainly imagine that there 
are a great many creative perspectives on the evolution of moral cognition that have yet to 
be considered. 
If this is the correct assessment, then it would seem that we are not in a position to place 
a great deal of confidence in any DFFRXQWRIRXUPRUDOSDVW,QGHHGLI,·PULJKWDQGZHGRQ·W
even have a full grasp of the space of hypotheses, then the most appropriate epistemic action 
we can take is noWMXVWWRDVVLJQDORZEXWGHILQLWHSUREDELOLW\WRDQ\RQHK\SRWKHVLVLW·VWR
avoid assigning definite probabilities altogether.13 Insofar as our epistemic situation with 
respect to our moral past is one of highly ambiguous evidence and an apparent unawareness 
of the wider space of options, it would seem that the most epistemically appropriate course 
of action for us is to avoid taking a stand prior to receiving more information³to suspend 
judgment on the matter of how things actually went. 
 
13 For discussion relating to probabilistic inferences in the absence of determinate evidence, see Joyce (2005). 
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It might be protested that the mystery of the moral past is not nearly as mysterious as the 
above discussion makes it out to be. In particular, one might suspect that we can rule out 
some moral genealogies owing to their manifest implausibility. My reply to this suggestion 
varies depending upon whether it is intended as a challenge to the letter or to the spirit of 
these accounts. Suppose firstly that it is a challenge to their letter. The claim is that³to take 
-R\FH·V JHQHDORJ\ DV DGHPRQVWUDWLYH H[DPSOHRI LWV WDUJHW³this particular execution of the 
hypothesis that our moral conscience is an adaptation is unconvincing. I very much agree 
with this line of response. That is to say, I agree that one could reasonably take issue with 
the finer details of any of these genealogies (for that claim is crucial to my argument). But 
this challenge still leaves open the possibility of a more plausible execution of the hypothesis 
WKDWRXUPRUDOFRQVFLHQFHLVDQDGDSWDWLRQ7KXVWKHVXJJHVWLRQGRHVQ·WXQGHUPLQHP\FODLP
regarding our current epistemic situation; for that situation is consistent with (and indeed, 
largely depends upon) the assumption that the moral genealogies available are amenable to 
improvement.  
Suppose, however, that the suggestion is intended as an attack upon the spirit of these 
genealogies. The suggestion is that any account that construes human morality as an 
adaptation can be ruled out automatically³perhaps owing to the well-known controversy 
surrounding moral nativism. (See Prinz 2009.) For my part, this challenge seems to amount 
to unlicensed dogmatism. No moral genealogy is free from controversy; each is inevitably 
confronted by challenges that partially undermine its scientific plausibility. For some 
theorists, moral nativism constitutes a controversial empirical assumption, whereas for 
others, assuming the falsity of nativism begs important scientific and methodological 
TXHVWLRQV ,W ZRXOG DSSHDU GRJPDWLF WKHQ WR YLHZ RQH·V RZQ WKHRUHWLFDO LQFOLQDWLRQV DV
providing decisive reason to completely rule out an entire class of hypotheses. And even if 
we were to permit such dogmatism, doing so would only narrow the domain of uncertainty. 
Even among the various non-nativist stories that remained, there would still remain 
considerable doubt concerning which of these is correct. And moral nativism is certainly not 
necessary to undermine moral knowledge; genealogies that do without this assumption can 
similarly carry skeptical implications. (Presumably, a hypothesis according to which our 
moral faculties were the result of random genetic drift would not spell victory for moral 
realism (see Kahane 2011, pp.111-2).) 
Accordingly, it seems that some degree of epistemic caution is warranted on our part. The 
considerations above ought to disincline us from placing a great deal of confidence in any 
one account (or kind of account) of moral evolution. We must instead await a future time (if 
any there be) when we are better equipped in the way of evidence to properly adjudicate 
between these hypotheses. Given our current position, it would be premature³and indeed, 
epistemically irresponsible³to place our faith in (or wholly rule out) any one hypothesis 
without further empirical findings to back up our choice. If we are to be epistemically 
responsible, then it seems that we must suspend judgment upon which account of moral 
evolution is the right one.   
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5.2 The mystery of the moral past: cui bono? 
Our epistemic situation with regard to the moral past is bad news for traditional debunking 
arguments. If debunkers are to transition from their empirical premises to their skeptical 
conclusion, then they must affirm that a particular kind of genealogy explains why we have 
the moral faculties that we have. But we can now see that this would be premature. Pace 
debunkers, we are simply not in a position to place a great deal of confidence in any account 
(or kind of account) of moral evolution. 
Our epistemic situation is, however, also bad news for the realist. Earlier I suggested that 
it might be open to the realist to embrace a non-debunking genealogy. Yet we can now see 
that she is no more in a position to affirm the truth of non-debunking genealogy than the 
debunker is to affirm the truth of her own. If they are to be epistemically responsible, then 
both the realist and the debunker must suspend judgment as to whether or not our 
evolutionary history undermines moral knowledge. Yet where does this leave moral 
knowledge? I will now suggest that these considerations may leave it in a very bad place 
indeed. 
6. A new debunking argument 
I have granted to the debunker that if her how-possibly story turned out to be the how-
actually story, then we would be led into wholesale moral skepticism. Unfortunately for the 
debunker, there are also non-debunking genealogies available, which, if true, put us in a 
position to deny that our evolutionary history undermines moral knowledge. But equally 
unfortunately for the realist, we cannot simply assume the truth of the latter hypotheses; we 
must suspend judgment upon which kind of genealogy is correct. In what follows, I suggest 
that this epistemic situation can be taken to support a new style of debunking argument.  
6.1 Debunking: old and new 
Our epistemic situation is as follows. We know that we are the products of a particular 
evolutionary history. But we do not know what kind of evolutionary history that is. 
Specifically, we do not know whether or not it is friendly to moral skepticism. I now want 
to propose that this epistemic situation opens the way for a new debunking argument 
(henceforth NDA): 
NDA1. Our evolution could have occurred in a debunking or in a non-debunking way.  
NDA2. If our evolution occurred in a debunking way, then we do not have moral 
knowledge.  
NDA3. If our evolution occurred in a non-debunking way, then we do have moral 
knowledge.14 
NDA4. We do not know whether our evolution occurred in a debunking or in a non-
debunking way.  
_______________  
We do not know whether or not we have moral knowledge 
 
14 I assume here that we do not have any independent reasons for doubting our claim to moral knowledge. 
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Notice that the NDA improves upon the traditional EDA in two key respects. Firstly, the 
new debunker does not find herself in the same precarious position as that of her 
predecessor, who rested her skeptical hopes upon a particular account of moral evolution. 
8QOLNHWKHWUDGLWLRQDOGHEXQNHUWKHQHZGHEXQNHUGRHVQ·WDVVXPHWKHWUXWKRIDQ\SDUWLFXODU
empirical hypothesis. This suggests a second advantage of the NDA: it better respects the 
open-endedness of scientific enquiry. The new debunker acknowledges affirms that further 
developments in the relevant areas of research are needed before we can place more 
confidence in any account of our moral past. 
Yet one might wonder why the NDA counts as a debunking argument. Consider the 
position of the moral realist now. Having been presented with the NDA, she acknowledges 
that she does not know whether her moral faculties are the outcome of a debunking or a 
non-debunking evolutionary history. Thus, she happily acknowledges that she does not 
know whether she knows some moral proposition m. But this seems like a far cry from 
conceding that she does not know that m.15 When all is said and done, the NDA merely tells 
us that: 
(a) We do not know whether or not we have moral knowledge  
It does not tell us that:  
(b) We lack moral knowledge  
However, I think that the right conclusion to draw from the NDA may in fact be (b). In 
what follows, I make my case.  
6.2 The return of moral skepticism 
In the remainder of this paper, I want to explore a possible route from the NDA to moral 
VNHSWLFLVP,QSDUWLFXODU,ZDQWWRSURSRVHWKDWWKHUHDOLVW·VVXVSHQVLRQRIMXGJPHQWXSRQ
the content of her evolutionary past provides her with a defeater for her moral beliefs. To 
motivate this suggestion, it will be helpful to first consider the following case:  
Leia agrees to be a subject in an experiment. At some stage during the experiment, 
she will be asked to sit a test which requires her to identify the colors of shapes on a 
sheet of paper. Before the test, some of the subjects are given a drug. Others are 
given a placebo. No one is told which they received. Nor are they told how many 
received the drug or the placebo. The drug has the following effect: it leads subjects 
to form beliefs about the colors of shapes³beliefs which are generated in a way that 
has nothing at all to do with what color any given shape happens to be. The drug has 
no other symptoms, and the subjects have been informed about its effects. Leia takes 
a pill, and she begins the test. The first question asks her to identify the color of the 
VTXDUH6KHZULWHV¶\HOORZ· 
 
15 Fans of the KK-principle might beg to differ. There is a straightforward route from the NDA to moral 
skepticism for those who take knowing that p to entail being in a position to know that one knows that p. But I do 
not wish to rest my arguments for the ND$·VVNHSWLFDOSRWHQWLDOXSRQWKH..-principle, whose fans are in relatively 
short supply nowadays. 
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$VVXPH WKDW/HLD·V FRORUYLVLRQ LV JHQHUDOO\ UHOLDEOH LQ WKHDEVHQFHRI DQ\GUXJV1RZ D
question: is it plausible to say of Leia that she knows that y¶WKHVTXDUHLV\HOORZ·"$GGUHVVLQJ
WKLV TXHVWLRQ ZLOO QR GRXEW UHTXLUH XV WR DWWHQG WR YDULRXV IHDWXUHV RI /HLD·V HSLVWHPLF
VLWXDWLRQ /HW·V IRFXV XSRQ KHU KLJKHU-order beliefs to begin with. How is Leia likely to 
UHVSRQGZHUHZHWRDVNKHU¶ZDV\RXUEHOLHIWKDW\IRUPHGLQDUHOLDEOHZD\"·6LQFH/HLDKDV
no clue whatsoever as to whether she received the drug, she would presumably refrain from 
either affirming or denying this; she would suspend judgment upon the proposition y*¶P\
belief that y was formed in a UHOLDEOH ZD\· DQG WKLV ZRXOG VHHP WR EH WKH DSSURSULDWH
response.16 
1RZDIXUWKHUTXHVWLRQZKDWLIDQ\LPSOLFDWLRQVPLJKW/HLD·VVXVSHQVLRQRIMXGJPHQW
upon y* have for her belief that y?  It seems to me that taking this sort of attitude towards y* 
has very bad implications indeed. In suspending her judgment, Leia suggests that she harbors 
significant doubts regarding the positive epistemic status of her belief that y. Indeed, she 
suggests that she would count herself rather lucky if that belief turned out to be true. In the 
face of such doubt and acknowledged dependence upon luck, I submit that it is incorrect to 
say of Leia that she really knows that y.  
A suggestion owing to Michael Bergmann will help us to put some more flesh on the 
ERQHVKHUH%HUJPDQQ·VIRFXVOLNHRXUVLVDQDJHQWZKRVXVSHQGVMXGJPHQWRQWKHPDWWHU
of whether a particular belief (or class of beliefs) that she holds was formed in a reliable way. 
Bergmann proposes to construe a suspension of judgment under such circumstances as 
JURXQGVIRUHSLVWHPLFGHIHDW,QKLVYLHZDQDJHQW·VVXVSHQVLRQRIMXGJPHQWXSRQDKLJKHU-
order proposition like y* is a doxastic attitude that provides her with an undercutting defeater 
for her belief that y; it provides her with grounds for thinking that her reasons for believing 
that y may not be indicative of its truth (2005, pp.426-7). Assuming (as is plausible) that 
knowledge requires an absence of defeaters, an agent who suspends judgment upon y* 
cannot properly be said to know that y.  
%HUJPDQQ·VIUDPHZRUNVXJJHVWVWKHIROORZLQJSODXVLEOHDVVHVVPHQWRI/HLD·VHSLVWHPLF
VLWXDWLRQ/HLD·VEHOLHIWKDWy falls short of knowledge in virtue of the undercutting defeater 
WKDWVKHKDVDFTXLUHGIRUWKDWEHOLHI7KHGHIHDWHULQTXHVWLRQLVD¶PHQWDOVWDWHGHIHDWHU·,W
is a doxastic attitude³specifically, a suspension of judgment upon y*³that reduces the 
positive epistemic status of the belief that y.   
The appeal to mental state defeaters here may arouse the suspicion that our assessment is 
one that only epistemological internalists would find appealing. However, this is not so; the 
importance of mental state defeaters is something acknowledged by externalists as well. (See 
for example, Nozick 1981, p.196; Goldman 1986, pp. 62-63, pp.111-7KXV%HUJPDQQ·V
suggestion is not especially partisan, and it should, I think, strike us as plausible. It is surely 
bad news for a belief, epistemically speaking, if one comes to believe that it may very well 
have been formed in an untrustworthy way.  
 
16 For those who are unsure as to whether this would indeed be the appropriate response, we can add that Leia 
has never been a subject in experiment before, and that she is unaware of the typical distribution of placebos under 
such conditions. 
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None of this is to suggest that for any candidate belief to count as knowledge, one must 
additionally hold a higher-order belief that that belief was formed in a trustworthy way. (It is 
possible that an agent has never even considered the latter, higher-order proposition.) We are 
only assuming here that a suspension of judgment upon p*¶P\EHOLHIWKDWp was formed in 
DWUXVWZRUWK\ZD\·FRQVWLWXWHVDQXQGHUFXWWLQJGHIHDWHUIRUWKHbelief that p. Thus, I do not 
claim that generally speaking, information regarding the positive epistemic credentials of 
RQH·V EHOLHIV LV QHFHVVDU\ LQ RUGHU IRU WKRVH EHOLHIV WR TXDOLI\ DV NQRZOHGJH , DP RQO\
suggesting that such information can have impoUWDQW LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU RQH·V NQRZOHGJH-
claims. 
%XWZKDW·VDOORIWKLVWRWKHPRUDOUHDOLVW",QRZZDQWWRSURSRVHWKDWVKHILQGVKHUVHOILQ
a parallel epistemic predicament upon being presented with the NDA. Insofar as the realist 
suspends judgment upon the higher-order proposition m*¶P\PRUDOEHOLHIVZHUHIRUPHGLQ
DUHOLDEOHZD\·17(in light of considerations of the kind discussed in Sect. 5.1), what is true of 
/HLDVHHPVHTXDOO\WUXHRIKHUPXWDWLVPXWDQGLV,IWKHUHDOLVW·VPRUDOEHOLHIVDUHWRTXDOLI\ 
as knowledge, then she cannot believe that those beliefs may very well have been formed in 
an untrustworthy way. In suspending judgment upon m*, the realist acquires an undercutting 
defeater for her moral beliefs. And insofar as her moral beliefs are defeated, they plausibly 
fall short of knowledge. 
2QHPD\REMHFWWKDWWKHUHLVDFUXFLDOGLVDQDORJ\EHWZHHQ/HLDDQGWKHPRUDOUHDOLVW/HLD·V
color judgments are formed on the basis of how things appear to her senses. She has no way 
to tell whether she has been given the drug, which operates precisely by exploiting the 
appearance²reality distinction. But a moral realist may very well take us to have direct 
intuitive access to the truth of moral propositions.18 If this is right, then perhaps we could 
check³´IURP WKHLQVLGHµDVLWZHUH³whether or not we are the products of a debunking 
genealogy. One need only consider gratuitous killing, intuit that it is obviously morally wrong, 
and triumphantly conclude that our faculties did not evolve so as to be unreliable. 
In my view, however, the important parallel between Leia and the moral realist is not how 
they form their respective judgments, but their assessment of how trustworthy their 
mechanisms of judgment-IRUPDWLRQ DUH 6R ORQJ DV WKH WUXVWZRUWKLQHVV RI RQH·V PRUDl 
intuitions (or faculties of moral insight or what-have-you) is something that can be brought 
into question, the basic challenge applies equally well to moral judgments. And it seems to 
me that moral intuitions can be brought into question by parallel considerations. At the very 
OHDVWRQHRXJKWWRKDYHOHVVFRQILGHQFHLQWKHGHOLYHUDQFHVRIRQH·VIDFXOW\RIPRUDOLQWXLWLRQ
when participating in experiments with belief-inducing drugs, or upon being informed that 
there is a priori JDVLQRQH·VYLFLQLW\19 
It is of course open to the moral realist to adopt a Cartesian posture in response. She may 
insist that the intuition that p is morally wrong is such that it renders p immune to rational 
doubt. But to do so would be to saddle herself with (what is to my mind) an implausible 
 
17 This is not to confuse two levels of explanation. M* concerns moral faculties themselves, the reliability of 
which is cast into doubt by some genealogies but not others.  
18 I thank an anonymous referee for raising this important challenge. 
19 So-called a priori gas is said to induce a ´«SKHQRPHQRORJ\RIEODWDQWREYLRXVQHVVµ+DZWKRUQHS 
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moral epistemology³and one that is radically out of step with what contemporary 
intuitionists believe. The vast majority regard intuitions as defeasible. It is commonly 
acknowledged that their justification-conferring power can be undercut by empirical 
considerations³IDFWVDERXWRQH·VFRJQLWLYHELDVHVVD\%HGNHSVHHDOVR$XGL
2009, p.31). 
$VPDOOFDYHDWLVLQRUGHUSULRUWRFRQFOXGLQJ,KDYHVSRNHQRI¶XV·DQGRI¶RXU·EHOLHIV
But EDAs may very well affect different people in different ways. Some, for example, may 
take themselves to have good reasons to think that God superintended the process of 
evolution, ensuring that our moral faculties would be reliable. (Though see Baras 2017.) It is 
therefore possible that a suspension of judgment will not be the most epistemically 
appropriate course of action for everyone. If that is right, then my core claim is best thought 
of as a conditional one: if our evidential situation is such that the epistemically appropriate 
response is to suspend judgment upon m*, then we are led to a skeptical conclusion. It would 
be brash to describe the case for the antecedent as dispositive. But I do believe that it 
presents a bona fide skeptical worry to be grappled with³and one that has clear advantages 
over traditional debunking arguments. 
7. Conclusion 
Traditional evolutionary debunking arguments rest upon the assumption that a particular 
kind of moral history represents our actual history. I have argued that the historical sketches 
that debunkers provide are highly questionable. In addition, I have suggested that the 
challenges to which these how-possibly stories are susceptible may ultimately be the 
symptom of a deeper epistemic predicament that we face: the fact that the available evidence 
does not allow us to reliably adjudicate the competing hypotheses that we have so far 
developed.  
Unfortunately, it does not follow from this that moral knowledge is home and dry; for I 
have also proposed that this epistemic situation may itself lay the foundations for a new kind 
of skeptical argument. There is of course still hope on the horizon. Perhaps as further 
information comes to light, we will be justified in believing our moral faculties to be the 
products of a non-debunking history. For the time being, though, moral knowledge seems 
to remain uncomfortably hostage to empirical fortune. 
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